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Opportunism in Brand 
Partnerships: Effects of Coercion 
and Relationship Norms
By Chekitan S. Dev, Stephan Grzeskowiak, and James R. Brown
Abstract
Brand partner opportunism—deceptive or guileful behavior to gain an advantage—is a threat to a successful brand 
partnership. In this study, the authors examined the effects of coercive and noncoercive tactics for preventing opportunism 
as those tactics are influenced by relational norms—mutually held standards of behavior that support close relationships. In 
a survey of 367 hotel general managers from two large hotel brands, the authors found that, in partnerships characterized 
by strong relational norms, coercive influence strategies, such as threats, promises, or legalistic pleas, are less effective 
at limiting opportunism than are noncoercive strategies, such as information exchange, recommendations, or requests, 
which are more effective. In contrast, when relational norms are weak, the authors found that coercive strategies are 
more effective than are noncoercive strategies. However, regardless of the nature of the relationship, the GMs reported 
that coercive techniques work only briefly and are ineffective over the long term. Thus, considering the nature of the hotel 
industry, noncoercive strategies are more likely to benefit brand headquarters’ efforts to limit brand partner opportunism.
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brand management; hotel franchising; hotel brand opportunism
Brand partnerships in hotels typically combine an owner 
(which often purchases a brand franchise) and an operator 
(which may or may not provide a brand identity). Regard-
less of the branding arrangement, these two separate 
business entities contribute their respective assets to give 
the hotel the required cachet to succeed in the marketplace. 
With a good relationship, the two entities can work together 
to help the hotel project an image in the marketplace and 
position itself against competing brands. The relationship 
between the two partners that combine to establish a hotel’s 
brand drives the way in which the customers, competitors, 
suppliers, and partners perceive the hotel—and, thus, the 
hotel’s success. However, when the relationship is not cor-
dial, the possibility arises that one partner or the other will 
work deceptively to its own advantage. In this article, we 
address that possibility, called opportunism, and discuss 
ways to control such deceptive practices.
Many research studies have concluded that good brand-
partner relationships can create value for both parties. Dev, 
Brown, and Lee (2000), in a study of brand-hotel partner-
ships, find that that positive brand relationships between a 
brand and a hotel lead to lower levels of opportunism and 
higher levels of mutual cooperation. In another study, 
Brown and Dev (1997) demonstrate empirically that 
better brand-hotel relationships lead to higher occupancy, 
average rate, gross operating profit, quality assurance 
scores, and guest satisfaction ratings. Poor brand partner-
ships, on the other hand, have the expected opposite effect. 
Let us look at two case studies from news reports in 2004, 
where a hotel and its existing brand parted company.
Case Study 1. When Scott Robinson “did the math,” his 
calculations changed not only the name of the downtown 
(Toledo, Ohio) Ramada Inn & Suites hotel, but also its 
business model. As general manager of the nineteen-story 
hotel at Jefferson Avenue and Summit Street, Robinson fig-
ured the property could do as much business, yet save 
thousands of dollars, by severing ties with Ramada and sell-
ing rooms through the Internet as an independent. That 
means having its own website as well as renting rooms at 
discount rates through online travel agents. “The individual 
hotel owners are caught in the middle of the battle between 
the chains and the websites,” he said. As a result, some 
hotel owners and managers, like Robinson, wonder whether 
they are better off without the chains. Cutting ties with 
Ramada saved Hotel Seagate $212,000 a year in franchise 
and marketing fees (Chavez 2004).
Case Study 2. Innkeepers USA Trust, a hotel real estate 
investment trust and a leading owner of upscale, extended-
stay hotel properties throughout the United States, announced 
that it had completed the acquisition of the 182-room Clarion 
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Hotel in downtown Louisville, Kentucky, for $6.4 million. 
The property, which was in foreclosure, will be reposi-
tioned and converted to a Hampton Inn following a $4.5 
million renovation program. “Hampton is one of the stron-
gest brands in the industry and offers guests all the 
advantages of the Hilton family of hotel brands, including 
HHonors, Hilton’s award-winning frequent guest program, 
and access to Hilton’s worldwide reservations system,” say 
the new owners (Innkeepers Trust 2004).
These case studies illustrate the costs of a failed relation-
ship between a hotel and its brand. In both cases, a brand 
lost its market presence, and in case 2 the hotel owner had 
also lost his investment to foreclosure. Smith Travel 
Research, leading provider of hotel statistics, reports that 
thousands of hotels change brand affiliations every year. 
Managing these brand relations has become a top priority 
for brands and hotels alike.
In this article, we examine one of the many sources of 
discord between a hotel and its brand, namely, opportun-
ism, which occurs when one of the partners acts dishonestly 
with regard to the interests of the other. While the brand 
could act opportunistically, we are principally concerned 
with how brands can influence the behavior of hotel owning 
partners who try to take advantage of the relationship. 
Given the industry’s recent struggle to maintain both rate 
and occupancy, it is easy to see how the temptation for 
opportunism might arise. While owners want their hotels to 
make a profit (regardless of occupancy and rate), brands 
want to maintain their rate (sometimes at the cost of occu-
pancy) to maintain their brand positioning and top line 
revenue (sometimes at the cost of profit) as they typically 
get paid as a percentage of revenue. Even when times are 
good, the hotel industry operates with a fundamental ten-
sion between rate and occupancy, on one hand, and revenue 
and profit, on the other (or, more to the point, between the 
goals of the brand and the owner). Thus, partners may be 
tempted to gain some advantage through dishonesty. For 
the brand managers, understanding how to influence a part-
ner’s behavior in a way that minimizes opportunism not 
only protects one’s own interests but also can strengthen the 
brand partner’s business, because opportunism’s short-term 
benefits often lead to long-term disadvantages for both part-
ners (Wathne and Heide 2000). In this study we wanted to 
test several strategies for managing brand partner opportun-
ism to see which strategies work best under which relationship 
conditions. In particular, we wanted to know whether 
brands can manage opportunism better by forming relation-
ships with their partners that establish certain expectations 
or norms of behavior.
Studying Opportunism
Ours is among the few studies to investigate brand partner-
ships in the hospitality sector, focusing on relationships 
between individual hotel properties and their brand head-
quarters in two North American lodging firms. We 
surveyed hotel general managers of two major brands not 
only because the industry exhibits some variation in 
brand characteristics, making our results generalizable to 
the hotel industry, but also because hotel general manag-
ers are well positioned to provide accurate data pertaining 
to their daily interactions with their brand headquarters 
(Dev, Brown, and Lee 2000; Parsa 1999). First we look 
at the dimensions of opportunism, and then we describe 
our study.
Literature Review
Scholars have been studying opportunism since the early 
1980s, focusing on a variety of influence strategies, 
or means of communication that are expected to produce 
favorable outcomes, such as reduced intrabrand conflict, 
brand partner satisfaction, and loyalty (see, for example, 
Frazier and Rody 1991; Frazier and Sheth 1985; Frazier and 
Summers 1984, 1986; and Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989).
Scholars generally classify influence strategies as coer-
cive or noncoercive. Coercive strategies involve attempts to 
control opportunism through some combination of rewards 
and punishment and by communicating to partners the 
likely consequences of guileful behavior. Here the basis for 
behaving cooperatively rather than antagonistically is said 
to be external to the target partner, meaning that the oppor-
tunistic behavior is to be altered not by making the behavior 
less intrinsically attractive to the brand partner but, rather, 
through such extrinsic approaches as promises of rewards 
and threats of punishments designed to increase the costs of 
opportunism. While the motive to undertake the behavior 
may well remain, the behavior is suppressed by the pros-
pect of punishment or reward. The coercive strategies we 
considered in our study include promises, threats, and 
legalistic pleas.
Noncoercive strategies involve attempts to change a 
brand partner’s attitudes towards the partnership, so with 
this type of strategy the basis of the influence is said to be 
internal to the target partner. Instead of discouraging an 
opportunistic partner from acting out of selfish motives, 
noncoercive strategies aim to make the target partner less 
opportunistic by its disposition. The three main categories 
of noncoercive influence strategies that we considered in 
our model are information exchange, recommendations, 
and requests (see, for example, Boyle, Dwyer, Robicheaux, 
and Simpson 1992; Mohr and Nevin 1990; and Payan and 
McFarland 2005).
Scholars refer to the cultivation of brand partner rela-
tionships that influence partner exchanges as socialization. 
Through socialization, one partner hopes to align the goals 
of another partner with its own, thereby avoiding potential 
opportunism by establishing relational norms that make the 
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a slightly more complex approach by looking at whether 
relational norms play a moderating role with respect to the 
effectiveness of influence strategies in limiting opportun-
ism. So, for instance, we looked at whether and how 
socialization might enhance or inhibit the effectiveness of 
both coercive and noncoercive strategies. In this way, we 
intended our study to yield implications for brand partners 
who are mindful of the level of socialization in their part-
nerships. From a theoretical standpoint, we wanted to 
examine process mechanisms, which include influence 
strategies. Exhibit 1 provides a graphic illustration of the 
structure of the conceptual framework of the study, map-
ping the relationships that we tested in our statistical 
analysis.
Coercive and noncoercive strategies. In contrast to coer-
cive strategies, noncoercive strategies operate less by 
directly rewarding or punishing bad behavior than by 
affecting the attitudes and beliefs of a brand partner to 
become more supportive and cooperative. Some scholars 
have argued in this respect that relational norms may sup-
port this process by enhancing reciprocal communication 
between partners, making it easier for one partner to deliver 
a message that limits opportunism by disposing the other 
second partner to some extent self-governing rather than 
responding only to more direct forms of influence. Such 
relational norms establish mutual expectations about appro-
priate behavior on the part of brand partners. We focused on 
the following three norms that become especially salient in 
the context of close partner relationships: solidarity, role 
integrity, and conflict harmonization. When partners share 
the solidarity norm, they attach an intrinsic value to their 
partnership and behave so as to advance the shared goals of 
the partnership, even sometimes at the expense of self-
interest. Partners that value role integrity share an interest 
in maintaining each other’s contribution to the effective-
ness of the partnership. Conflict harmonization indicates 
the extent to which the partners are able consistently to 
resolve potential or actual conflicts quickly to their mutual 
satisfaction (see Brown, Dev, and Lee 2000; Heide and 
John 1992; Kaufmann and Dant 1992; Kaufmann and Stern 
1988; and Macneil 1980).
Conceptual Framework
While the scholarly literature has focused primarily on the 
direct effects of relational norms on opportunism, we took 
Exhibit 1:
The Impact of Influence Strategies on Opportunism: The Moderating Effect of Relational Norms
Information Exchange
Recommendations
Requests
Non-Coercive
Influence
Partner
Opportunism
Relational
Norms
H2 a(–); H2b (+)
H1a (+); H1b (–)
Relationship
Preservation
Conflict
Harmonization
Role
Specification
Control Variables:
• Partner Replaceability
• Partner Motivational 
Investment
• Hotel Brand
• Ownership
Promises
Threats
Legalistic Pleas
Coercive
Influence
Note: Requests are shown for theoretical purposes. In practice, they were a negligible factor that the study did not analyze.
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partner to fully and diligently process the information 
contained in the message. Within an environment that 
enhances communication in this way, noncoercive influ-
ence strategies can be applied more effectively to limit a 
partner’s opportunism (Bhatnagar 1993; Bonoma 1976; 
Kasulis and Spekman 1980; Falbe and Yukl 1991; Jap, 
Manolis, and Weitz 1999; Mohr and Sohi 1995; and Payan 
and Nevin 2006).
You can see how such an environment would enhance 
the relational norms of role integrity and conflict harmoni-
zation. Effective message communication should encourage 
one’s partner to fully process a message’s content, and this 
helps to maintain the partners’ roles. With open lines of 
communication, the partners will have already overcome a 
barrier to conflict resolution, as their messages to and from 
one another will be conveyed clearly, facilitating negotia-
tions over potential disagreements. When it is difficult 
for partners to communicate openly, on the other hand, dis-
putes arise over the messages themselves, blocking 
progress on more substantive issues such as price or supply 
availability. This renders noncoercive strategies ineffec-
tive, at best, and the relationship can deteriorate even 
further, as weak relational norms open communications to 
misinterpretations and eventually the exploitation of shared 
information.
By the same token, we wanted to study the impact of 
relational norms on coercive strategies, such as threats, 
promises, or appeals to legal obligations. In essence, coer-
cive strategies invoke immediate rewards for complying 
with contractual agreements or exchange arrangements 
and punishments for noncompliance. This suggests that 
coercive strategies are only as effective as the credibility 
of the rewards and punishments being invoked. Because 
coercive strategies by design operate in the short term, 
they are likely to be most effective in an exchange environ-
ment in which the partners work at arm’s length. If neither 
partner operates with long-term future outcomes in mind, 
imminent rewards and punishments seem more credible in 
the context of a relationship built on short-term financial 
outcomes.
Indeed, in an exchange environment characterized by 
strong relational norms, coercive strategies are likely to 
provoke dismay and frustration. If one partner perceives 
another as seeking an untoward advantage, the first partner 
will then easily justify opportunistic behavior in reaction. 
That is, where strong relational norms prevail, norm viola-
tion is likely to be reciprocated. Again, the effectiveness of 
coercive influence strategies seems to depend on the weak-
ness or absence of relational norms in the partnership. 
Coercive strategies work best when transactions are viewed 
as “strictly business,” while noncoercive strategies work 
best when “it’s a pleasure doing business with you” is a 
natural expression of partner commitment (Ganesan 1994; 
Lusch and Brown 1982; Provan and Skinner 1989; Schurr 
and Ozanne 1985).
Hypotheses
We tested our reasoning on the effects of relational norms 
on influence strategies by formulating four hypotheses, two 
in reference to noncoercive influence and two in reference 
to coercive influence.
Noncoercive influence. We believe that strong relational 
norms should make noncoercive influence more effective 
in limiting partner opportunism. We formulated our 
hypotheses from the point of view of a firm seeking to 
influence partners with this goal in mind. If the firm in 
question perceives that its relationship to a particular brand 
partner is based on strong relational norms, we proposed 
the following:
Hypothesis 1a: To the extent that a firm perceives 
high levels of relational norms as characterizing 
the brand relationship, noncoercive influence 
strategies will be negatively linked to the extent of 
its brand partner’s opportunistic behavior.
This hypothesis predicts that empirical data will confirm 
the proposition that noncoercive influence works more 
effectively in limiting partner opportunism when a firm’s 
relationship to a given partner is based on relational norms 
such as solidarity, role integrity, or conflict harmonization. 
The converse of H1a is based on our belief that a relation-
ship with weak relational norms will undermine the 
effectiveness of noncoercive strategies in limiting partner 
opportunism:
Hypothesis 1b: To the extent that a firm perceives 
low levels of relational norms as characterizing 
the brand relationship, noncoercive influence 
strategies will be directly linked to the extent of its 
brand partner’s opportunistic behavior.
This hypothesis suggests that the use of noncoercive 
techniques will fail where relational norms are weak, and 
such approaches may in fact increase opportunism because 
the partner may well suspect the noncoercive approach or 
view it as vulnerability.
Coercive influence. We believe that weak relational norms 
enhance the effectiveness of coercive influence strategies in 
limiting partner opportunism. We state that in the following 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a: To the extent that a firm perceives 
low levels of relational norms as characterizing the 
brand partnership, coercive influence strategies will 
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be negatively linked to the extent of its brand part-
ner’s opportunistic behavior.
This hypothesis predicts that empirical data will show that, 
when strong relational norms have not developed in a 
partner relationship, coercive strategies such as threats, 
promises, and legal pleas will be more effective in limiting 
opportunism in the behavior of the partner. Conversely, to 
test our reasoning on coercive influence and strong 
relational norms, we proposed the following:
Hypothesis 2b: To the extent that a firm perceives 
high levels of relational norms as characterizing 
the brand relationship, coercive influence strate-
gies will be positively linked to the extent of its 
brand partner’s opportunistic behavior.
Here the prediction is that a firm will be frustrated in its 
efforts to limit partner opportunism if it attempts to use 
coercive influence strategies in the presence of strong 
relational norms. In these cases, the partner is likely to be 
surprised and dismayed by such coercive tactics, perhaps 
feeling that established norms have been violated, making 
the partner more likely to consider retaliatory opportunism 
in response.
The Sample
We tested these hypotheses by examining the relationship 
between individual hotels and their brand headquarters 
in two large hotel firms doing business in North America. 
We selected these two companies because each has both 
company-owned properties and franchised units. The ques-
tionnaire that we sent was pretested with a group of more 
than thirty hotel general managers enrolled in an executive-
development program at the Cornell School of Hotel 
Administration. We also asked senior managers in both hotel 
chains to review the questions to ensure their relevance.
We surveyed hotel general managers to gather our data, 
because our pretest determined that the hotel’s GM was the 
person within the hotel best qualified to report on the hotel’s 
relationship with its brand headquarters. The two hotel 
chains provided names of GMs and their hotel addresses, 
and we sent our questionnaire to 1,736 hotel general man-
agers. Some were undeliverable or their hotels had switched 
brand affiliation, leaving a pool of 1,650 potential 
respondents.
To increase the response rate, we included a cover letter 
in support of the research from the hotel company’s chief 
operating officer, and we assured the participants that all 
responses were confidential. Thus, we present only aggre-
gate results here. We also offered each participant an executive 
summary of the study as an inducement to participate. 
Finally, we sent follow-up letters to managers who did not 
respond within four weeks of the initial mailing. This resulted 
in a total of 367 completed questionnaires, representing a 
22 percent response rate. No difference was found in the 
results between brands. A comparison of early responders 
to late responders revealed no significant differences on the 
constructs of interest; therefore, nonresponse bias does not 
appear to be an issue for this research (see Armstrong and 
Overton 1977).
Measures
We used the following four constructs to represent the fac-
tors we wanted to measure in testing our hypotheses: hotel 
opportunism, headquarters’ use of coercive influence, 
headquarters’ use of noncoercive influence, and relational 
norms. To measure hotel opportunism, we targeted what 
scholars call “active opportunism,” which involves behav-
iors that are prohibited under the terms of the partner 
contract. The measure was taken on the basis of responses 
ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree on a four-
item, 7-point Likert-type scale. We measured the two 
categories of influence strategies by directly measuring a 
set of component strategies for each one. In the case of 
coercive influence, we tested promises, threats, and legal-
istic pleas, using a similar 7-point scale that was based on 
previous research. For noncoercive influence, we used 
similar scales to measure information exchange, recom-
mendations, and requests. We approached relational norms 
in the same way, directly testing relationship preservation 
(solidarity), role integrity, and conflict harmonization on 
scales based on existing research to determine the extent 
to which our sample of general managers applied these 
terms to their relationship with brand headquarters (Boyle 
et al. 1992; Brown, Dev, and Lee 2000; and Frazier and 
Rody 1991).
We controlled for three variables to enhance the accu-
racy of our measures. First, research has found that 
opportunism is significantly related to dependence in rela-
tionships between partners, so we controlled for this by 
testing aspects of dependence that have been posited in the 
research literature, namely, motivational investment in the 
brand partner—in the case of a hotel property, this would be 
its perception of the importance of the brand to its success—
and the difficulty of brand replacement, which involves the 
cost and commitment required for the hotel property to 
align itself with another brand. Again we used 7-point 
scales similar to those described above. Because our sample 
came from two hotel chains and included both franchised 
and headquarters-owned properties, we added two control 
variables to account for these differences (Emerson 1962; 
Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989; Joshi 1998; and Provan and 
Skinner 1989).
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We adjusted our use of some of the constructs based on 
a factor analysis that allowed us to combine the scale items 
pertaining to the three individual relational norms into a 
single indicator of relational norms and to combine two of 
the aspects of coercive influence (namely, legalistic pleas 
and threats) into a single measure. We should note also that 
we excluded from the noncoercive influence category the 
request strategy, because it is rarely employed and therefore 
did not converge with the results pertaining to information 
exchange and recommendations (Frazier and Rody 1991; 
Frazier and Summers 1986; Stoddard, Keith, and Brown 
2000). Following these adjustments, we ascertained that 
our revised measurement model fit the data acceptably and 
exhibited the appropriate forms of statistical validity (see 
Exhibit 2 for the measurement model results and Appendix 
for a list of retained items). We also ruled out what is known 
as common method bias through standard approaches in the 
literature (Podsakoff and Organ 1986; Podsakoff et al. 2003).
Analysis
We tested the hypotheses by estimating the structural equa-
tions depicted in Exhibit 1. Our data fit the structural model 
acceptably (c2 = 936.45, df = 633, p < .01; root mean square 
error of approximation [RMSEA] = .04, p (close fit) = 1.00, 
comparative fit index [CFI] = .94, nonnormed fit index 
[NNFI] = .93). Exhibit 3 reports the means, standard 
deviations, and correlation coefficients for the study con-
structs. The statistical model explained 30.6 percent of 
the variance in hotel opportunism, 12.8 percent of the 
variance in customer relationship performance, and 21.4 
Exhibit 2:
Convergent Validitya
Construct Indicator Loading t-Value AVE r
OPP  1 .779 fixed 56.00% .79
 2 .763 12.050
 3 .690 11.468
COEb  1 .854 fixed 58.10% .60
 2 .757 14.581
 3 .694 13.344
 4 .816 fixed 54.40% .91
 5 .734 15.641
 6 .836 18.762
 7 .786 17.179
 8 .705 14.837
 9 .518 10.219
10 .642 13.176
11 .726 15.417
12 .799 17.589
NCO  1 .860 fixed 54.50% .83
 2 .708 14.666
 3 .869 18.027
 4 .516 9.960
NRM  1 .863 fixed 50.90% .92
 2 .821 20.194
 3 .835 20.809
 4 .710 16.022
 5 .637 13.709
 6 .784 18.665
 7 .768 18.065
 8 .824 20.304
 9 .448 8.911
10 .735 16.878
11 .584 12.264
Control Variables
MI  1 .792 fixed 48.60% .73
 2 .778 10.017
 3 .493 8.070
RPL  1 .761 fixed 50.00% .75
 2 .594 9.784
 3 .737 11.418
Note: AVE= average variance extracted; OPP = hotel opportunism; 
COE = brand coercive influence; NCO = brand noncoercive influence; 
NRM = relational norms; MI = hotel motivational investment in seller; 
RPL = hotel replaceability.
a. Goodness-of-fit indices: c2 = 1,080.94, df = 572, p < .00; comparative
fit index (CFI) = .93; Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) = .92; normed fit index 
(NFI) = .86; root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .049, 
p(Close Fit) = .60.
b. The measurement model specifies two facets of coercive influence
strategies (COE). Facet one (item 1 through item 3) measures 
“promises” and facet two (item 4 through item 12) measures “threats” 
and “legalistic pleas.”
Exhibit 3:
Correlations
OPP COE1 COE2 NCO NRM MI RPL
OPP .56
COE1 .06 .58
COE2 .06 .47 .54
NCO .00 .00 .02 .55
NRM .18 .13 .09 .05 .51
MI .01 .01 .01 .01 .02 .49
RPL .01 .06 .06 .69 .29 .19 .50
Mean 1.99 2.64 2.72 4.58 5.4 3.47 4.43
SD 1.11 1.27 1.34 1.2 1.07 1.48 1.28
Number 
   of  
   items
3 9 3 4 11 3 3
Note: Bold numbers on the diagonal show average variance extracted. 
Numbers below the diagonal represent squared correlations. OPP = hotel 
opportunism; COE1&2 = brand coercive influence (1 = promises; 
2 = threats and legalistic pleas); NCO = brand noncoercive influence; 
NRM = relational norms; MI = hotel motivational investment in seller; 
RPL = hotel replaceability.
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percent of the variance in hotel operational performance 
(see Exhibit 4).
Our statistical analyses were carefully adjusted to mini-
mize various possible difficulties, based on standard 
procedures (as explained further in Brown et al. 2008). Our 
analysis confirmed the two hypotheses pertaining to the use 
of noncoercive influence to limit partner opportunism. H1a 
predicts that, when brand relationships are characterized by 
strong relational norms, noncoercive influence will effec-
tively limit partner opportunism. Conversely, H1b predicts 
that, when relational norms are weak, noncoercive influence 
will exacerbate partner opportunism. When our brand head-
quarters employs noncoercive influence strategies in the 
presence of strong relational norms, opportunism decreases, 
while it increases when headquarters applies noncoercive 
strategies in the presence of weak relational norms. See 
Exhibit 5 for a graphic illustration of these results.
We achieved mixed results with regard to coercive influ-
ence strategies. H2a predicts that when brand relationships 
are characterized by weak relational norms, coercive influ-
ence will effectively limit partner opportunism. That did 
not prove to be the case. Coercive strategies are linked to an 
increase in opportunism even when employed in the pres-
ence of weak relational norms, so H2a is not confirmed. H2b 
predicts that, when relational norms are strong, coercive 
influence will exacerbate partner opportunism. We found 
confirmatory evidence for H2b, suggesting that when our 
brand headquarters employed coercive strategies in the 
presence of strong relational norms, opportunism increased 
significantly. In short, coercive strategies are correlated 
with an increase in opportunism regardless of the status of 
the relationship. Still, coercion provoked less opportunism 
in a weak relationship than in a strong one, suggesting that 
coercive tactics are somewhat less damaging when rela-
tional norms are weak than when they are strong. See 
Exhibit 5 for a graphic illustration of these results.
Managerial Implications
Before we offer practical implications, we must note the 
limitations of this study. The limitation that bears most 
directly on our study’s practical application is that our data 
are based on the perceptions of hotel property managers 
rather than on those of executives at brand headquarters. It 
is certainly possible that those executives will not share the 
perceptions of their property managers that pertain to their 
relationships. We also essentially tested influence flowing 
only in one direction (i.e., from the brand to the hotel). All 
this suggests future projects. For example, our study clearly 
identifies an area that deserves further research, and that is 
the question of how relational norms are developed and pre-
served. With those caveats, let us discuss the elements for 
managing opportunism that we identified here.
Exhibit 4:
Structural Model Estimatesa
Hypothesis
Independent 
Variable
Regression 
Coefficientb t-Value
Constant 3.22* 8.24
Control variables
MI 0.08* 2.11
RPL 0.09 1.76
Main effects
 H1 NRM –0.45* –7.52
 H2 COE 0.13* 2.57
 H3 NCO 0.05 1.12
Interaction effects
 H4 NRM × NCO –0.12* –2.69
 H5 NRM × COE 0.07 1.51
R2 .20
Note: OPP = hotel opportunism; COE = brand coercive influence; NCO 
= brand noncoercive influence; NRM = relational norms; 
MI = hotel motivational investment in seller; RPL = hotel replaceability.
a. Dependent variable is hotel opportunism (OPP).
b. Unstandardized coefficients.
*p < .05.
Exhibit 5:
Decomposing the Effects of Relational Norms on the 
Relationship between the Brand’s Use of Influence Strategies 
and Hotel Opportunism—(a) Noncoercive Influence; (b) 
Coercive Influence
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Based on what we learned from the hotel managers, 
brand executives should approach opportunism on the part 
of brand partners by carefully assessing the quality of their 
relationships. Those who enjoy relatively close relation-
ships marked by strong relational norms such as solidarity 
and conflict harmonization should find it advantageous to 
employ noncoercive influence strategies in trying to limit 
or prevent opportunism. They can expect, for example, that 
when they share information with brand partners, the part-
ners will not misuse that information, and that they can rely 
on the information that flows back from the partner. The 
better your relationship with a brand partner, the more 
effective noncoercive influence strategies will be in limit-
ing opportunism.
Where relational norms are weak or nonexistent, however, 
noncoercive strategies unfortunately may encourage oppor-
tunism. Instead, our results suggest that, in the absence of 
strong relational norms, coercive influence techniques are 
more effective in limiting opportunism than noncoercive strat-
egies; but we must note again that coercive approaches must 
be considered only as short-term tactics and that they appar-
ently provoked opportunism regardless of relational norms.
Ultimately, our research adds to a trend in the literature 
that finds that coercive influence strategies, applied under 
conditions of weak relational norms, provide, at best, only 
short-term relief from partner opportunism. Over the long 
run, however, coercive influence tends to exacerbate oppor-
tunistic behavior because it is seen as limiting a partner’s 
autonomy. Opportunism is a common recourse in such 
cases. In the hospitality industry these outcomes may be 
even more likely, because a hotel manager and brand head-
quarters are more closely allied. If you enjoy good relations 
with your property managers, you will limit opportunism 
most effectively if you take the noncoercive approach.
Appendix
Construct Measures
Hotel Opportunistic Behavior
1. Sometimes we have had to alter the facts slightly
in order to get what we need from headquarters.
2. To get the necessary support from headquar-
ters, we sometimes mask the true nature of our 
needs.
3. On occasion, my hotel has had to lie to headquar-
ters about certain things in order to protect our 
interests.
Brand Coercive Influence
Promises
1. Your partner promises to make things easier for
you if you agree to the request.
2. Your partner makes promises to give something
back in return for specific actions by your
company.
3. If you go along with your partner, they promise
certain services for you.
Legalistic Pleas
4. Your partner stated or implied that your legal agree-
ment either suggested or required compliance.
5. Your partner makes a point to refer to legal
agreements you have when attempting to influ-
ence your actions.
6. In attempting to change your behavior, your part-
ner draws your attention to your contractual
agreement with them.
7. Your partner indicates that you are contractually
bound to observe their requests.
Threats
8. Your partner makes it clear that failing to comply
with their requests would result in penalties
against your business.
9. Your partner states or implies that you might
receive poorer service or cooperation if you do
not comply.
10. If you did not go along with your partner, they
threatened to withdraw certain services from
you.
11. If you do not agree to their suggestions, your
partner would make things difficult for you.
12. Your partner threatens to cancel or refused to
renew your contract if you refuse their requests.
Brand Noncoercive Influence
Recommendations
1. Your partner states or implies that by following
their suggestions, your hotel would be more
profitable (or have higher volume or greater
share, etc.).
2. If you comply with the request, your partner pre-
dicts higher profits (or increased share, volume,
etc.) for your hotel.
3. Your partner anticipates that by adhering to their
advice, your company would make more money,
increase sales, etc.
Information Exchange
4. Your partner tries to convert you to see the ben-
eficial effects of a policy by giving you details on
a broad spectrum of company matters.
(continued)
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Relational Norms
Harmonization of Conflict
1. My hotel and brand headquarters are very con-
scientious, responsive, and resourceful in
maintaining a cooperative relationship.
2. Both parties try to resolve any disagreements
that arise between us in good faith.
3. The high level of mutual trust between my hotel
and brand headquarters enable us to settle our
disagreements to everyone’s satisfaction.
4. Both my hotel and brand headquarters are gener-
ally able to resolve disagreements to both parties’ 
satisfaction.
Preservation of the Relationship
5. Both my hotel and brand headquarters consider the
preservation of our relationship to be important.
6. My hotel and brand headquarters are commit-
ted to the preservation of a good working
relationship.
7. Both my hotel and brand headquarters think it is
important to continue our relationship.
8. Both my hotel and brand headquarters work hard
at cultivating a good working relationship.
Specification of Roles
9. Even though our relationship with brand head-
quarters is not complex, we are still uncertain
about who does what (reversed).
10. Our two organizations have well-formed expec-
tations of each other which go beyond buying
and selling of products and services.
11. Even though our relationship with brand headquar-
ters is extremely complicated, both parties have
clear expectations as to the role each performs.
Control Variables
Buyer Motivational Investment in Seller
1. Our current brand affiliation is essential to the
success of our hotel.
2. What proportion of your sales is accounted for
by the brand’s reservations system? (1—very 
small proportion; 7—very large proportion).
3. Compared to other brands, this one is much more
successful at generating sales revenue for its 
affiliated hotels.
Buyer Replaceability
1. Which organization in this relationship could
more easily replace the other with a comparable 
brand partner? (1—our hotel could more easily 
replace our brand partner; 7—our brand part-
ner could more easily replace us).
2. Which organization in this relationship has more
feasible alternatives for replacing the other? (1—
our hotel has more feasible alternatives; 7—our 
brand partner has more feasible alternatives).
3. If our relationship were to terminate, our brand
partner could easily find another comparable 
replacement hotel in our market area.
Note: Scale anchors are 1—strongly disagree to 7—strongly agree unless 
otherwise noted.
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